How can the incapacity defence in contract law coexist with the concept of universal legal capacity advanced by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)? In the absence of clear guidance from the CRPD on the link between legal capacity and mental capacity, and given the silence of this Convention on the concept of contractual capacity, this article stresses the need to redefine contractual capacity in a manner that responds not only to economic interests (eg upholding the security of transactions) but also to social interests (including the protection of values such as dignity). The discussion insists that incapacity and disability must never be conceptually equated and calls for a definition of contractual incapacity that moves beyond the medical condition of individuals (whether this is known by or apparent to the other contracting party) and which considers the circumstances of the transaction. These arguments are explored in the context of English contract law, focusing on the question of contractual validity when a party lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction and the other party was unaware of the incapacity and acted in good faith.
Introduction
Entering into legally binding agreements with others is instrumental in advancing one's personhood.
1
The CRPD and the concepts of universal human dignity and universal capacity
The CRPD and Article 12 have been the subject of extensive academic scrutiny. 51 This discussion focuses on the need to ensure that any attempt to address implementation challenges associated with Article 12 CRPD must be guided by a framework of principles that reflect citizenship values (including the protection of human dignity) and assesses how these values can inform our understanding of contractual capacity.
The Convention, which is the first binding international human rights instrument focused specifically on the rights of persons with disabilities, 52 reframes the interest of persons with disabilities in terms of human rights 53 and reflects a perception of people as subjects of human rights (rather than as objects of care), 54 will full entitlements in society (rather than disempowered victims). 55 mental and contractual capacity. However, despite this silence, the CRPD has the potential to be a benchmark in guiding a re-examination of legal concepts such as contractual capacity in light of the values pursued by the Convention, including dignity.
The implementation of Article 12 CRPD would not require an abandonment of the incapacity defence in contract law. In fact, in a framework which recognises universal legal capacity (the ability possessed by everyone to hold and exercise rights and duties) 82 and distinguishes this from mental capacity (the decision making skills of an individual, which vary from person to person and may be influenced by external factors), 83 the exercise of universal legal capacity could be facilitated by an effective legal framework where parties can rely, when appropriate, on defences such as contractual incapacity. However, the effectiveness of the incapacity defence in contract law depends on a range of factors. Bach rightly notes that as the incapacity defence in contract law may be invoked by anyone, this defence is compatible with Article 12 CRPD, but incompatibility would arise if incapacity and disability were conceptually equated. 84 Concerns about incompatibility with the CRPD could arise, even in a disability neutral concept of incapacity, if differential treatment on the basis of mental capacity had a disproportionate impact on people with disabilities, 85 The issue of mental incapacity in English contract law has been noted for its 'topsy-turvy' history.
143
Influenced by the approach adopted in Roman Law, Bracton's thirteenth century account of English law noted that contracts with parties who lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction were void. 144 This provided complete protection to A who, in the absence of mental capacity to understand the contract, could not have consented to that transaction to voluntarily assume contractual obligations. 145 However, as this approach allowed mere proof of incapacity to invalidate the contract, it was criticised for being subjective, encouraging fraudulent claims, undermining the security of transactions and failing to consider B's interests. 146 A few centuries later, the balance shifted to the other extreme. 200 Yet, A should be entitled to a greater degree of protection than it was envisaged under the Imperial Loan framework.
In Archer, the New Zealand Court of Appeal recognised the importance of safeguarding A's interests.
In a decision that 'clearly diverged' from the approach confirmed in Imperial Loan, 201 Archer established that in assessing the validity of a contract entered into by a party who lacked the mental capacity to understand its nature, courts should consider not only if B was aware of the incapacity, but also, irrespective of B's knowledge, whether the agreement was 'unfair' to A. 202 Factors which could indicate unfairness and which must be assessed objectively include the absence of independent legal advice for A, disparity in the parties' mental capacities, leading to an unequal bargaining position and a sale for a price significantly below the market value. 203 Despite the absence of such classification in Archer, the first two factors could be associated with procedural fairness (concerned with the manner in which the contract was formed), whilst the latter could be equated with a concern for substantive fairness (focused on the contract terms). 204 Lady Hale's interpretation of the Imperial Loan rule to include both actual and constructive knowledge, and the potential significance of a broad understanding of constructive knowledge to include the circumstances of the transaction, would provide a welcome degree of balance between the interests of A and B. However, enthusiasm must be tempered by an acknowledgement of the context in which Lady Hale put forward her remarks. 231 In Dunhill, the Supreme Court was asked to decide, inter alia, whether the validity of a settlement of claim between a party who lacked the mental capacity to understand its nature and another party who was unaware of the incapacity, was determined by the general rule in Imperial Loan, or whether it was subject to the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) (which required the court's approval to be valid). 232 The Supreme Court held that the validity of such settlement of claim is to be determined in accordance with the CPR, rather than by 228 Ibid. 229 York Glass v Jubb, above n 167, [292] . See Chitty, above n 50, 9-082. 230 Chitty, above n 50, 9-082. See Hart v O'Connor, above n 46, [1024] [1025] [1026] . 231 Ibid, 9-079. 232 Civil Procedure Rules 1998/3132, Rule 21.10(1). See Chitty, above n 50, 9-084.
whether B had actual or constructive knowledge of such incapacity. 242 In assessing the latter part of the test, the courts may consider whether the circumstances surrounding the transaction 'ought to have put' B on inquiry regarding A's mental incapacity. Interventions may be justified when a contract has been entered unto in the absence of such understanding due to mental incapacity, the obligations are not voluntarily assumed due the absence of consent and B had actual or constructive knowledge of the incapacity. Only a 'particularly rigid conception' of freedom of contract understands this principle to mean 'unrestricted freedom to make contracts', irrespective of moral considerations that 'cry out for the imposition of some restrictions' 250 and understands the role of contract law as limited to enforcing the parties' agreements. 251 As Kimel correctly notes, a rigid conception of freedom of contract is 'highly unrealistic', given the many forms in which the law intervenes to protect 'vulnerable contracting parties'. 252 The function of contract law is not limited to enforcing the parties' agreements, but includes, inter alia, the prevention of 'certain kinds of harm', considering values such as fairness.
253
Questions concerning the validity of a contract between A and B may require courts to make a choice not only between two innocents, but also between two competing policies. They may involve a choice between releasing A from a transaction concluded without the mental capacity to understand its nature and to consent to it, balanced against upholding the security of transactions. A broad interpretation of Lady Hale's formulation in Dunhill may be seen to undermine 'the practical need for commerce to take place without traders and others requiring to consider the mental incapacity of their contracting parties where it is not apparent'. 254 Nevertheless, a framework which considers the circumstances of the transaction and includes reference to grossly imbalanced contacts, may not be that objectionable. In fact, 'legal intervention over one sided bargains' may have considerable social benefits, 255 as it may lead to a reduction in 'extreme claims in negotiations' and an increase in the number of contracts that parties are willing to enter into, resulting in 'a wealthier society'.
256
An emphasis on social values would skew the balance between the narrow and broad reading of Lady
Hale's formulation in Dunhill in favour of the latter. While the narrow interpretation reflects individualist values focused on leaving parties to look after their own interests, the broad interpretation of Lady Hale's statement reflects concern for wider community values, including fairness. 257 It also moves the focus away from an individual-centred approach (assessing A's mental incapacity and whether this was known by, or apparent to B), to consider the environment in which 252 Kimel, above n 252, p 119. 253 the transaction was conducted (eg the gross imbalance of consideration, the absence of independent legal advice and whether courts should enforce such a transaction). Parallels can be drawn with discussions in the context of undue influence and unconscionability, which resist approaches centred only on A's absent consent or B's wrongful conduct, consider wider norms that govern how contracting parties should treat each other 258 and assess the circumstances when the state would consider 'an exploitive contract' as 'an unworthy endeavour to support' and enforce. 259 A broad reading of Lady Hale's statement in Dunhill becomes even more significant if we consider wider social factors. For example, a contract entered into by an elderly person who experiences memory loss (which could potentially be associated with a form of dementia) is likely to be problematic. 260 McKendrick comments that such a situation raises 'an acute conflict of policy', as the need to protect such parties from exploitation must be weighed against the 'wish not to infantilise the elderly'. 261 The number of cases involving contracts with parties who may lack the mental capacity to understand the nature of the transaction is likely to grow, including because of an increase in the number of people who develop mental health conditions such as dementia. 262 Hudson correctly notes that in a legal framework where courts place more weight on upholding the security of transactions over considerations of fairness, the family members of such contracting parties may be tempted to take the management of financial affairs out of their hands, risking 'tension and distress'. 263 A vision of contract law which overlooks fairness-based considerations and wider social concerns is unlikely to provide a satisfactory response to such situations. The CRPD has sparked the need to re-examine legal concepts in light of legal values pursued by the Convention, including the protection of human dignity. The exercise of universal legal capacity can operate more effectively in a legal framework where parties can rely, when appropriate, on legal concepts such as an incapacity defence in contract law that reflects not only economic but also social values. As Collins accurately states, 'principles such as respect for the liberty and dignity of the individual' should influence not only the public sphere, but should also 'guide all legal regulation of civil society'. 265 Once private law is perceived as 'a form of social regulation', it becomes legitimate to question whether particular concepts protect adequately individual autonomy and dignity. 266 Collins concedes that the interplay between human rights law and private law could either lead private law to become more receptive 'to arguments about fairness' or stimulate instead 'a restatement of a more liberal, laissez-faire approach in private law', but that 'both directions of development seem to be on the cards'. 267 A key factor that may skew the outcome in favour of the former approach is the ability to develop 'a balancing mechanism suitable for contract law' that protects rights without undermining freedom of contract. 268 This article has sought to identify this balancing mechanism with regards to contractual capacity.
The law regarding the validity of contracts entered into between A (who lacked the mental capacity to understand the nature of the transaction) and B (who was unaware of the incapacity and acted in good faith), has been described as 'a battleground' of conflicting policies. 269 The most appropriate response in such circumstances is a balanced approach that protects the interests of both parties to the transaction. Yet, the history of this area of law has witnessed a shift from extreme responses A reinterpretation of the Imperial Loan rule could also have implications for the law of agency, and may prove relevant when re-evaluating the potential of this area of law to provide a legal framework for some forms of supported decision making. 277 While an assessment of these implications is outside the scope of this article, it is important to draw a brief parallel between the tale of two innocents discussed above and the more complex framework of an agency agreement, 278 which could potentially involve three innocent parties. 279 The interplay between economic and social concerns is also manifested in this context, 280 although the balance seems focused on protecting A's interests, with limited protection conferred to the agent or the third party who transacted with A through an agent. 275 Chitty, above n 50, 9-088. 276 Warrington LJ in York Glass v Jubb, above n 167, [292] . 277 284 indicating that the Imperial Loan rule does not apply to agency agreements and to contracts concluded by the agent on behalf of the principal. 285 The agent may have apparent authority to bind the principal 286 or may be liable to the third party for breach of warranty of authority. 287 Whilst an exception from the Imperial Loan rule may seek to protect A's interests, a void contract overlooks A's will and preferences regarding the transaction.
However, in the twentieth edition of Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, Watts notes that the Imperial Loan rule should apply to agency agreements and that the other party (eg agent or third party)'s knowledge of incapacity could render the contract voidable. 288 Furthermore, Higgins suggests that Drew 289 and Yonge
290
could be confined to their facts. 291 with reference to doctrines such as unconscionability and undue influence. 304 Yet, the incapacity defence in contract law can coexist with the notion of universal legal capacity advanced by the CRPD, as long as it can be invoked by anyone and disability and incapacity are not conceptually equated 305 and any disproportionate impact on persons with disabilities can be objectively justified as serving a legitimate aim under the CRPD, pursued through reasonable means. 306 This article has called for an interpretation of contractual capacity which moves beyond the medical condition of individuals (whether this was known by or apparent to the other party to the transaction) and considers environmental factors (such as the circumstances of the transaction). The discussion has also stressed the need to redefine contractual capacity in a manner that addresses not only economic concerns (such as upholding the security of transactions) but also social values (including the protection of human dignity). These arguments were explored in the context of English contract law, with a focus on the question of assessing the validity of a contract between a party who lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction and another party who was unaware of the incapacity and acted in good faith. This particular focus was chosen due to the policy implications of this question, requiring a reflection on the relevance of social values in a framework currently dominated by economic interests. The article sought to demonstrate not only how a redefined concept of contractual capacity can be accommodated within the parameters of English contract law, but also why this is important. The discussion highlighted the social arguments for legal intervention in the case of grossly imbalanced contracts 307 and the important contribution that contract law can play in defining the wider social norms that govern how parties should treat each other. 308 It has also stressed the potential increase in the number of parties which may seek to rely on the incapacity defence, including due to an increased number of people who develop mental health conditions such 304 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws, Report 124, November 2014, 11.10. 305 Bach, above n 6, pp 4-5. 306 Martin et.al, above n 101, p 7. 307 Morgan, above n 220, p 215; Buckley, above n 259, p 145. 308 Chen-Wishart, above n 261; Morgan, above n 220, p 208.
as dementia 309 and the need for an appropriate response from contract law which considers wider social concerns. Over the past decades, English contract law has witnessed a positive change in the language employed to refer to parties who lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction they entered into. While earlier cases referred to 'lunatics', 310 more recent cases rightly refer to 'persons'. 311 It is important that this positive change in language is matched by a redefined vision of the incapacity defence, which moves beyond the medical condition of individuals and considers the circumstances of the transaction. An assessment of the substantive and procedural fairness of the transaction may translate into the language of contract law a concern for wider social values and respect for human dignity.
